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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4103(2)0).
ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Issue 1: Did the trial court properly hold that Jennie Nordgren "made a claim"
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 30-2-11, by serving a notice of intent?
Standard of Review: The trial court's statutory interpretation of Utah Code Ann. §
30-2-11 is reviewed for correctness. S.C, 1999 UT App. 251 at ^ 8.
Issue 2: Did the trial court properly dismiss Plaintiff Chad Nordgren's loss of
consortium claim when he served his notice of claim fifteen (15) months after Jennie
Nordgren served her notice of intent?
Standard of Review: The trial court's statutory interpretation of Utah Code Ann §
30-2-11 and the trial court's ruling on Appellee's Motion to dismiss are reviewed for
correctness. S.C, 1999 UT App. 251 at f 8; Oakwood Village LLC

v. Albertsons, Inc.,

2004 UT 101, 104P.3d 1226.
Issue 3: Did the trial court properly hold that the Utah Health Care Malpractice
Act, applies to Chad Nordgren's loss of consortium claim, which allegedly arose out of
health care provided to his spouse?
Standard of Review: The trial court's statutory interpretation of Utah Code Ann. §
78B-3-401 et seq. and Utah Code Ann. § 30-2-11 is reviewed for correctness. S.C v.
Anderson, 1999 UT App. 251, f 8, 987 P.2d 611.
vii

CONSTITUIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES,
RULES AND REGULATIONS
Utah Code Ann. §30-2-11
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-3-401 etseq.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
1. Nature of the Case:
Plaintiff Chad Nordgren appealed from Judge Wallace A. Lee's July 28, 2009,
Memorandum Decision and Order, which granted Dr. Blomquist's Motion to Dismiss
Mr. Nordgren's claim for loss of consortium.
2. Course of the Proceedings and Disposition in the Court Below:
On June 12, 2007, Jennie Nordgren served Dr. Jeffrey Brown, Dr. Roger D.
Blomquist, and the Sevier Valley Family Clinic with a notice of intent, and, thereby,
began her medical malpractice action. (R. at 3, 20, 36-37, 123-124). Jennie Nordgren
alleged that Defendants negligently failed to timely diagnose her colorectal cancer. (R. at
36-37).
Jennie Nordgren5s husband, Plaintiff Chad Nordgren, was not named as a party in
the underlying medical malpractice action and did not assert any loss of consortium
claims during discovery. (R. at 64-67). On September 11, 2008, however, Chad
Nordgren sent a notice of claim to counsel for Defendants indicating, for the first time,
that he wished to pursue a claim for loss of consortium. (R. at 37-38). Four days later, on
September 15, 2008, Mr. Nordgren filed his Complaint and Jury Demand with the Sixth
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Judicial District Coiirt seeking damages for loss of consortium arising out of the medical
care and treatment thai Defendants provided ;»> Jamie Nuidgiui. \ K. ai I u).
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Mr. Nordgren's actions were at odds with the legislature's clear intent and were
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Care Malpractice Act to argue that Chad Nordgren's claims were governed by the Utah
Health Care Malpractice Act and should have been made "at the time" that Jennie
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argued that, based upon Chad Nordgren's deposition and Jennie Nordgren's answers to
discovery, Dr. Blomquist did not have notice of Chad Nordgren's loss of consortium
claim and was prejudiced by Mr. Nordgren's failure to timely make his claim. (R. at
71-73).
Dr. Brown and Sevier Valley Family Clinic joined Dr. Blomquist's Reply arguing
that the trial court did not have jurisdiction over Mr. Nordgren's action because he failed
to comply with the conditions precedent set forth in the Utah Health Care Malpractice
Act. (R. at 108-111).
Judge Lee issued a Memorandum Decision and Order dismissing Chad Nordgren's
Complaint because he "failed to follow the requirements of Utah Code Ann. § 30-2-11."
(R. 120-126). The trial court made the following findings: (1) that the Utah Health Care
Malpractice Act applies to "Plaintiff and his loss of consortium claim because [his claim]
arises out of injury to his spouse resulting from health care provided to her by
Defendants;" (2) that in the medical malpractice context, beginning a malpractice action
by filing a notice of intent to commence action, constitutes making a "claim" for
purposes of the Loss of Consortium Act; (3) Chad Nordgren's claim was not "made at the
time that the claim of the injured person [was] made" and was, therefore, untimely; and
(4) that filing within the two year statute of limitations applicable to Jennie Nordgren's
malpractice action, does "not meet the statutory requirements of [Utah Code Ann.] § 302-11 and [Chad Nordgren's] loss of consortium claim should be dismissed." (R. at 123—

x

124). Chad Nordgren then tiled his Notice of Appeal and the Utah Supreme Court
assigned this case to the I Jtah Court of Appeals. (R. at 128 129, 134).
3- Staten lent of the f 'acts:
In December 2005, Dr. Jeffrey Brown and the Sevier Valley Family Clinic
pro. w^; nic.-div.al care and treatment h. * ,,,-,.= ^ i u g ; ^ ,, .^k;„ .:.,i!i,i /\o;dgrciL ; : r.'in
which Dr. Brown believed was related to kidney stones. (R. at 1-2). According Dr.
Brown ordered a CT scan to confirm this diagnosis. (R at 2), Dr Blomquist reviewed the
C' I scai i o.f; IVft s 1 Jot dgren's abdoi i lei t and pelvis m
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kidney stones. (R. at 2). Dr. Brown and the nursing staff at the Sevier Valley Family
Clinic prescribed treatment for Mrs. Nordgren's kidney stones. (R. at 2-3). Jennie
Nordgrei i w as later diagnosed "\ < • itl :t colorectal cancel (R at 3)
On June 12, 2007, Mrs. Nordgren tiled and served each Defendant with a notice of
intent to commence action and request toi picliligation p..nel review, pursuant to •:,-.• \ IM.
Health Care Malpractice Act. (R. at 20, 37). Mrs. Nordgren alleged thai Dt. Hrou u i >r.
Blomquist. and the Sevier Valley Fatnily Clinic acted negligent!*. In railing n> timeK

commence action and the request for prelitigation panel review did not name Chad
Nordgren as a party and did hui melius <m> oss o\ cwiiMMuuni uiinii. ik ui ..()). because
an existing arbitration agreement uoverned her medical malpractice claim * H v •'
of Professional Licensing dismissed Mrs. Nordgren's request for prelitigation panel
review and tl le pai ties coi m i lenced arbiti atic i I. (R at 213, 3' 1 ).
xi

Mrs. Nordgren was the only Petitioner named in the arbitration. (R. at 64-67).
During discovery, Mrs. Nordgren was asked in interrogatories to wC[s]tate specifically and
in detail what causes of action [she was] claiming against these [Defendants and the
basis for each claim." (R. at 64). In response, Mrs. Nordgren relied solely upon her notice
of intent, which did not mention Chad Nordgren as a party or make a loss of consortium
claim on his behalf. (R. at 64). During Jennie Nordgren's deposition, she asserted claims
for medical expenses, travel expenses, and lost family income, but she did not assert any
claims for or on behalf of Chad Nordgren for loss of consortium. (R. at 65). Chad
Nordgren did not assert a claim for loss of consortium at the time of his deposition as a
fact witness in Jennie Nordgren's arbitration. (R. at 65-67). When asked why he was not
a party to Mrs. Nordgren's suit, he responded that he did not know. (R. at 65-67).
On September 11, 2008, approximately fifteen (15) months after Jennie Nordgren
first asserted her claims and causes of action, Chad Nordgren served each Defendant with
a notice of claim indicating, for the first time, that he wished to assert a claim for loss of
consortium and join in the arbitration. (R. at 67). Four days later on September 15, 2008,
Mr. Nordgren filed a Complaint and Jury Demand with the Sixth Judicial District Court
for loss of consortium arising out of medical care and treatment that Defendants provided
to Jennie Nordgren. (R. at 1-6). On July 28, 2009, Judge Wallace A. Lee dismissed Mr.
Nordgren's Complaint because he failed to timely commence his action pursuant to the
Loss of Consortium Act and the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act. (R. at 120-126).
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS
The trial court properly dismissed Plaintiff Chad Nordgren's loss of consortium
claim for failure to fulfill the statutory requirements of the Loss of Consortium Act, Utah
Code Ann. § 30-2-11. Subsection (4)(a) requires a loss of consortium plaintiff to make
his claim at the time the injured spouse makes her underlying injury claim. See Utah
Code Ann. § 30-2-1 l(4)(a). Jennie Nordgren made her claim on June 12, 2007, when she
began her medical malpractice action by serving her notice of intent to commence action.
Chad Nordgren, however, did not timely make his loss of consortium claim "at the time"
that Jennie Nordgren began her medical malpractice suit. Instead, Mr. Nordgren asserted
his loss of consortium claim fifteen months after Jennie Nordgren served her notice of
intent and after the parties had performed substantial discovery.
Subsection (4)(b) of the Loss of Consortium Act, requires that a loss of consortium
claim derived from medical malpractice abide by to the provisions of the Utah Health
Care Malpractice Act, including the filing of a notice of intent 90 days prior to
commencing an action against a health care provider. Utah Code Ann. § 30-2-1 l(4)(b).
Chad Nordgren failed to fulfill these statutory requirements. This failure frustrated the
purposes of the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act by not permitting the parties to
effectively evaluate and possibly settle claims prior to litigation.
Chad Nordgren failed to fulfill the statutory requirements of the Loss of
Consortium Act. As a result, Dr. Blomquist did not have adequate notice of Chad
Nordgren's loss of consortium claim. In addition, ChadNordgren improperly avoided the
xiii

requirements of the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act. These circumstances hindered Dr.
Blomquist's ability to explore all claims that were asserted against him. Accordingly, the
trial court properly dismissed Chad Nordgren's loss of consortium claim. Dr. Blomquist
respectfully requests that this Court affirm the ruling of the trial court.

xiv

ARGUMENT
The Loss of Consortium Act, Utah Code Ann. § 30-2-11, requires that a loss of
consortium plaintiff make his claim at the time the injured person initially makes a claim,
whether in a formal complaint, demand for arbitration, application for hearing, or notice
of intent. The Loss of Consortium Act, states in pertinent part:
A claim for the spouse's loss of consortium shall be:
(a) made at the time the claim of the injured person is made and
joinder of actions shall be compulsory; and
(b) subject to the same defenses, limitations, immunities, and
provisions applicable to the claims of the injured person.
Utah Code Ann. § 30-2-11(4) (emphasis added). Accordingly, when Chad Nordgren
asserted his loss of consortium claim approximately fifteen months after Mrs. Nordgren
served her notice of intent, the trial court appropriately dismissed his cause of action
because he failed to fulfill the statutory requirements of the Loss of Consortium Act. (R.
at 123). Specifically, (1) Chad Nordgren failed to make his claim at the time Jennie
Nordgren made her claim by serving her notice of intent to begin her medical malpractice
action, as required by subsection (4)(a) of the Loss of Consortium Act; and (2) Chad
Nordgren failed to pursue his loss of consortium claim according to the provisions and
limitations of the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act, Utah Code Ann. § 78B-3-401 et seq,
as required by subsection (4)(b) of the Loss of Consortium Act. See Utah Code Ann. §§
30-2-1 l(4)(a), 30-2-1 l(4)(b).
This Court reviews the trial court's statutory interpretation of the Loss of
Consortium Act and the trial court's ruling on Dr. Blomquist's Motion to Dismiss for
1

correctness. See S C v. Anderson, 2009 UT App. 251, ^[8, 987 P.2d 611, see also
Oakwood Village LLC
I.

v Albertsons, Inc , 2004 UT 101 at 1(104, 104 P.3d 1226.

The trial court properly dismissed Chad Nordgren's claim for loss of
consortium for his failure to meet the statutory requirements of Utah Code
Ann.§30-2-ll(4)(a).
Subsection (4)(a) of the Loss of Consortium Act requires that a spouse's claim for

"loss of consortium shall be . . . made at the time the claim of the injured person is made
and joinder of actions shall be compulsory." Utah Code Ann. § 30-2-1 l(4)(a). Plaintiff
Chad Nordgren failed to fulfill this statutory requirement.
a) The trial court properly held that Jennie Nordgren "made a claim" by
serving a notice of intent.
Jennie Nordgren began her medical malpractice claim against Defendants by filing
a notice of intent on June 12, 2007, the trial court properly held that in doing so Jennie
Nordgren "made a claim" for purposes of the Loss of Consortium Act. (R. at 123-124).
The trial court recognized that the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act defines "a claim" as
a "medical malpractice action against a health care provider." (R. at 123). The trial court
then noted that by serving a notice of intent on June 12, 2007, Jennie Nordgren began her
medical malpractice action. (R. at 123).1 The trial court held that beginning a malpractice
action constituted a "claim," for purposes of Utah Code § 30-2-11(4). (R. at 123-124).

1

Contrary to Mr. Nordgren's assertions, the trial court never held that a notice of intent to
commence action "equals" a malpractice action under the Utah Health Care Malpractice
Act. See Appellant's Brief at 8-12. Accordingly, this Court should disregard Mr.
Nordgren's arguments that are based upon this premise. See Appellant's Brief at 8-12.
2

When construing legislative enactments, the court's primary objective is to give
effect to the legislature's intent. See LPI Services v. McGee, 2009 UT 41 , 1J11, 215 P.3d
135 (citing Savage v. Utah Youth Vill, 2004 UT 102, T[18, 104 P.3d 1242). To discern
legislative intent, this Court should first look to the statute's plain language. See id.
(citing Martinez v. Media-Paymaster Plus, 2007 UT 32ffif46, 164 P.3d 384). Courts
must "read the plain language of the statute as a whole and interpret its provisions in
harmony with other statutes in the same chapter and related chapters." See LPI Services,
2009 UT at TI11. The trial court's holding follows the plain language of the Loss of
Consortium Act and harmonizes its provisions with the Utah Health Care Malpractice
Act.
In order for the Loss of Consortium Act to be interpreted in harmony with the
purposes of the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act, service of a notice of intent must
constitute "a claim." See Utah Code Ann. 30-2-1 l(4)(a). One of the primary purposes of
the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act is to give health care provider defendants notice of
all claims and give the parties the opportunity to evaluate and discuss claims, defenses,
and settlement potential prior to becoming locked into a lawsuit. See Behrens v. Raleigh
Hills Hosp., Inc., 675 P.2d 1179, 1183 (Utah 1983); see also Utah Code Ann. § 78B-3402(3) (stating that the purpose of the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act is to, in part,
"expedite early evaluation and settlement of claims" (emphasis added)). To this end, the
Utah Health Care Malpractice Act requires medical malpractice plaintiffs to serve a
notice of intent and file a request for prelitigation panel review prior to filing a complaint.
3

See Plaits v. Parents Helping Parents, 947 P.2d 658, 661 (Utah 1997); see also Utah
Code Ann. § 78B-3-412; see also Utah Code Ann. § 78B-3-416.
The purposes of the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act are frustrated when a loss
of consortium plaintiff fails to give notice of his claims at the time the medical
malpractice plaintiff serves her notice of intent. When a defendant is not aware of all
claims being made against it, it cannot effectively and accurately evaluate claims,
defenses, and settlement potential. In this matter, Dr. Blomquist was not aware of Chad
Nordgren's claims until September 2008, after Dr. Blomquist had engaged in substantial
discovery regarding Jennie Nordgren's claims, including the depositions of both Jennie
Nordgren and Chad Nordgren. Chad Nordgren's untimely assertion of his loss of
consortium claim under these circumstances is precisely what the Loss of Consortium
Act sought to avoid.
Mr. Nordgren mistakenly argues that the Loss of Consortium Act requires that a
party must file a formal complaint in order to make a claim. See Appellant's Brief at 816. This argument is inconsistent with the language and intent of the governing statutes.
The plain language of the Loss of Consortium Act is not as restrictive as Mr. Nordgren
suggests. Had the legislature intended that a party could only make a claim by filing a
formal complaint, it would have said as much. The legislature, however, chose much
broader language that requires a loss of consortium claim to be "made at the time" of the
underlying claim, which may be prior to litigation. See Utah Code Ann. § 30-2-1 l(4)(a).
Additionally, Chad Nordgren's proposed interpretation violates foundational rules of
4

statutory interpretation, which require, that whenever possible, a court interpret a statute
by giving effect to each term and endeavor to interpret it in harmony with other statutes.
See Grant v. Utah State Land Board, 485 P.2d 1035, 1036 (Utah 1971) (recognizing that
the foundational rules of statutory interpretation require a court to "assume that each term
was used advisedly; and that each [term] should be given an interpretation and
application in accord with their usually accepted meaning"); see also Smith & Sons v.
Utah Labor Commission, 2009 UT 19, If 7, 218 P.3d 580 (indicating that courts should
interpret statutes in harmony with other statutes in the same and related chapters).
Mr. Nordgren argues that subsection (4)(a) of the Loss of Consortium Act cannot
be interpreted literally because doing so would deprive a loss of consortium plaintiff of
his claim if his spouse resolved her claim outside of the judicial process. See Appellant's
Brief at 12-16. Specifically, Mr. Nordgren argues that if the injured spouse resolved her
claim outside of the judicial process, a loss of consortium plaintiff, could not make his
claim at the same time or join his spouse's claim. Mr. Nordgren's argument, however, is
premised upon the false assumption that in order to make "a claim," a party must file a
formal complaint, which is inconsistent with the plain language and intent of both the
Utah Health Care Malpractice Act and the Loss of Consortium Act. See Appellant's Brief
at 12-16. If a loss of consortium plaintiff makes his claim at the time that the injured
spouse initially asserts her claim, whether in a formal complaint, notice of intent, or an
application for hearing, then a loss of consortium plaintiff will not be deprived of his
claim. Accordingly, this interpretation does not render the Loss of Consortium Act or any
5

poition thereof "void and/or inoperable" and does not lead to an absurd outcome as Mr.
Nordgren argues. See Appellant's Brief at 13. Instead, this interpretation of the Loss of
Consortium Act is in accordance with its plain language, fulfills the purposes of the Utah
Health Care Malpractice Act, and avoids duplicative claims and unnecessary costs.
b) The trial court properly dismissed Chad Nordgren's loss of consortium
claim, when he served his notice of claim fifteen months after Jennie
Nordgren served her notice of intent.
The plain language of the Loss of Consortium Act establishes that Chad Nordgren
failed to timely make his claim when he served his notice of claim fifteen (15) months
after Jennie Nordgren made her claim by serving a notice of intent. In fact, the Loss of
Consortium Act states in relevant part: "A claim for the spouse's loss of consortium shall
be .. . [mjade at the time the claim of the injured person is made and joinder of actions
shall be compulsory." Utah Code Ann. 30-2-1 l(4)(a) (emphasis added).
When reviewing the plain language of a statute, the foundational rules of statutory
interpretation require a court to "assume that each term of a statute was used advisedly;
and that each [term] should be given an interpretation and application in accord with their

The trial court never held that Mr. Nordgren was required to file a formal
complaint on June 12, 2007. But see Brief of Appellant at 12-16. In fact, because the trial
court held that the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act was applicable to Mr. Nordgren's
loss of consortium claim, requiring him to file a formal complaint on June 12, 2007,
would be inconsistent with the trial court's holding and the Utah Health Care Malpractice
Act. Instead, the trial court merely held that by serving his notice of claim fifteen (15)
months after Jennie Nordgren began her claim and after the parties had engaged in
substantial discovery, Chad Nordgren's did not timely assert his claim pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. § 30-2-11(4). (R. at 124).
6

usually accepted meaning." See Grant, 485 P.2d at 1036. The Loss of Consortium Act
requires that a loss of consortium claim "shall be .. . made at the time the claim of the
injured spouse is made." Utah Code Ann. 30-2-1 l(4)(a). Pursuant to the plain language of
this statute, its "usually accepted meaning," and when interpreting this statute in harmony
with other related chapters, a loss of consortium plaintiff must make his claim at the time
that the injured party initially makes a claim, whether in a notice of intent, formal
complaint, or even in an application for hearing before the labor commission. See Utah
Code Ann. § 30-2-1 l(4)(a); see also Diener v. Diener, 2004 UT App. 314, ^ 12, 98 P.3d
1178 (noting "the use of the word 'shall' in a statute creates a mandatory condition"). If
the statute were interpreted otherwise, a loss of consortium claim in medical malpractice
cases, arbitrations, or workers compensation cases would inevitably lead to piece meal
litigation, duplicative claims, and unnecessary costs.
Chad Nordgren did not make his claims "at the time the claim of the injured
person [was] made." Utah Code Ann. 30-2-1 l(4)(a). Instead, he made his claim for loss
of consortium fifteen (15) months after Mrs. Nordgren made her claim. Accordingly,
from June 2007 to September 2008, Dr. Blomquist was wholly unaware of Chad
Nordgren's loss of consortium claim and proceeded to conduct discovery and case
evaluations accordingly. (R. at 64-67). When Chad Nordgren served his notice of claim
the parties had proceeded well into the factual discovery regarding Jennie Nordgren's
claims. (R. at 67). Accordingly, Chad Nordgren's failure to timely make his claims at the
time Jennie Nordgren filed her notice of intent is contrary to the plain language of the
7

Loss of Consortium Act and ultimately frustrates the purposes of the Utah Health Care
Malpractice Act to efficiently evaluate and settle claims. See Utah Code Ann. § 78B-3402.
Mr. Nordgren argues that the Loss of Consortium Act only requires that a loss of
consortium claim is "filed in such a manner that allows a court (or arbitrator) to consider
both the claims when making a decision." (R. at 41); see Appellant's Brief at 15. This
argument, however, does not follow the foundational rules of statutory interpretation
because it does not give weight to each term used in the statute. See Grant, 485 P.2d at
1036. Mr. Nordgren's interpretation merely amounts to a mandatory joinder of loss of
consortium claims and, thereby, ignores the first phrase of the statute, which requires that
a loss of consortium claim shall be "made at the time the claim of the injured person is
made." Utah Code Ann. § 30-2-1 l(4)(a). Mr. Nordgren's interpretation conveniently
subsumes any separate meaning inherent in "made at the time" into the statute's joinder
requirement. Furthermore, if Mr. Nordgren's argument is taken to its logical conclusion,
an underlying tort claim could proceed through fact and expert discovery then on the eve
of arbitration the loss of consortium claimant could assert his claim for the first time,
thereby, undermining the arbitration and the discovery process.
Chad Nordgren alleges that pursuant to Crabtree v. Woodman, No. 2:06-CV-946TC, 2008 WL 4276957 (D. Utah, Sept. 11, 2008), and Buffer v. Kozitza, 75 N.W.2d 480
(Minn. 1985), he has an independent right to bring a separate loss of consortium claim
outside of Jennie Nordgren's arbitration. See Appellant's Brief at 12-16. Mr. Nordgren's
8

argument misses the mark. Whether or not Chad Nordgren can bring a separate claim for
loss of consortium has never been at issue. Instead, at issue, is whether Chad Nordgren
can appropriately assert his cause of action for loss of consortium by filing a notice of
claim approximately fifteen months after Jennie Nordgren began pursuing her claims.
Despite, Mr. Nordgren's attempt to construe Crabtree v. Woodman to address the
timing of a loss of consortium claim, Crabtree v. Woodman, never addresses the "made at
the time" requirement contained in the Loss of Consortium Act. See Crabtree v.
Woodman, 2008 WL 4276957. Furthermore, Crabtree demonstrates the importance of
both a medical malpractice plaintiff and the loss of consortium plaintiff jointly engaging
in evaluations and settlement negotiations prior to litigation. See id. at *3-4. In Crabtree,
Ms. Crabtree settled her claim. See id. at *2. Mr. Crabtree later requested settlement of his
claim and the defendant argued that the integration clause of the settlement agreement
applied to both the injury and the loss of consortium claims. The Utah district court held
that Ms. Crabtree's release did not release Mr. Crabtree's separate loss of consortium
claim, which could be pursued and tried separately. See id. at *5. Because a loss of
consortium is a separate claim that a plaintiff can pursue separately in litigation if the
underlying injury claim settles, then a health care practitioner defendant must be aware of
both claims when the medical malpractice plaintiff files a notice of intent. To hold
otherwise, would disregard the purpose and the importance of the Utah Health Care
Malpractice Act's prelitigation process and purpose to facilitate early assessment and
resolution of claims were appropriate. See Utah Code Ann. § 78B-3-402.
9

Mr. Nordgren relies upon the Minnesota Supreme Court's holding in Buffer v.
Kozitza, 375 N.W.2d 480, 482 (Minn. 1985), to argue that he timely and appropriately
asserted his claim in September 2008, by filing a formal complaint with the Sixth District
Court. See Appellant's Brief at 14-16. Mr. Nordgren's reliance is misplaced. The Huffier
court examines an automobile accident case, which is not subject to Utah's unique Loss
of Consortium Act or the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act. See id. at 481. Although the
Minnesota loss of consortium statute contains a mandatory joinder requirement, it does
not contain any requirement that the loss of consortium claim shall be "made at the time
the claim of the injured person is made" or a requirement that the loss of consortium
claim is subject to the provision and limitations of the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act.
See id. at 482; see also Utah Code Ann. § 30-2-11(4). Accordingly, although Justice Tena
Campbell relied on Huffier in a Utah automobile accident case, Huffier is not applicable to
this Court's delermination. See Crabtree, 2008 WL 4276957, *5.
Jennie Nordgren made her claim when she began her medical malpractice action
on June 12, 2007, by serving a notice of intent. By serving a notice of claim and filing his
complaint fifteen (15) months later, in September 2008, Chad Nordgren did not timely
make his claim "at the time the claim of the injured person [was] made." See Utah Code
Ann. § 30-2-1 l(4)(a). The trial court, therefore, properly held that Mr. Nordgren failed to
fulfill the statutory requirements of the Loss of Consortium Act and properly dismissed
his loss of consortium claim. Accordingly, this Court should affirm the ruling of the trial
court on this basis.
10

II.

The trial court properly dismissed Chad Nordgren's loss of consortium claim
for his failure to meet the statutory requirements of Utah Code Ann. § 30-2ll(4)(b) by failing to comply with the provisions of the Utah Health Care
Malpractice Act.
Subsection (4)(b) of the Loss of Consortium Act requires that a spouse's claim for

"loss of consortium shall be . . . subject to the same defenses, limitation, immunities, and
provisions applicable to the claims of the injured person." Utah Code Ann. § 30-21 l(4)(b). Plaintiff Chad Nordgren failed to fulfill this statutory requirement by failing to
abide by the provisions of the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act. Whether the Utah
Health Care Malpractice Act applies to Chad Nordgren's loss of consortium claim is a
matter of statutory interpretation that is reviewed for correctness. See S.C, 1999 UT App.
at f 8. When interpreting a statute, a court must "first look to the plain language of the
statute and give effect to that language unless it is ambiguous. Only where that language
is ambiguous [does a court] consult other sources for meaning." Progressive Casualty
Ins. Co. v. Ewart, 2007 UT 52, U 16, 167 P.3d 1011.
a) The plain language of the Loss of Consortium Act establishes that the
Utah Health Care Malpractice Act is applicable to Chad Nordgren's loss
of consortium claim.
Pursuant to the statutory definition of a loss of consortium claim, the defenses,
immunities, and provisions of the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act are applicable to
Chad Nordgren's claim for loss of consortium. See Utah Code Ann. § 30-2-1 l(4)(b). The
Loss of Consortium Act expressly directs that a loss of consortium claim is "subject to
the same defenses, limitations, immunities, and provisions applicable to the claims of the
injured person." Utah Code Ann. § 30-2-1 l(4)(b) (emphasis added). It is undisputed that
11

"the injured person" in this matter is Jennie Nordgren, and that her malpractice action is
subject to the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act. (R. at 1-6, 44).
Accordingly, Chad Nordgren's loss of consortium is, likewise, subject to the
defenses, limitations, immunities, and provisions contained in the Utah Health Care
Malpractice Act, which include, among other things, the statutory requirement to serve a
notice of intent 90 days prior to service of a complaint. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 30-211(7), 78B-3-412; see also Carter v. Milford Valley Memorial Hospital, 2000 UT App.
21, ^| 13, 996 P.2d 1076 (acknowledging the Medical Malpractice Act's mandatory
preconditions to litigation). Mr. Nordgren failed to serve a notice of intent to commence
action, as required by Utah Code Ann. § 78B-3-412. (R. at 36-38, 44-46). The trial court,
therefore, properly dismissed for Mr. Nordgren's failure to abide by the statutory
requirements of the Loss of Consortium Act.
b) The plain language of the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act establishes
that it applied to Chad Nordgren's loss of consortium claim.
Pursuant to the plain language of the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act, Chad
Nordgren's loss of consortium claim is a wCmalpractice action against a health care
provider." See Utah Code Ann. § 78B-3-403(16). Defendants are "health care providers"
and it is undisputed that Jennie Nordgren's medical malpractice claim is a "malpractice
action against a health care provider." (R. at 44); see Utah Code Ann. § 78B-3-403(12);
see also Utah Code Ann. § 78B-3-403(16). A loss of consortium claim is a derivative
cause of action because "it arose out of or was occasioned by an injury to the spouse."
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Hackfordv. Utah Power & Light Co., 740 P.2d 1281, 1290 (Utah 1987) (Durham, J.,
dissenting). A loss of consortium claim, however, is also "an action for direct injury to
the plaintiff spouse who no longer has the marital benefits of society, comfort, and
protection." Id.
Chad Nordgren's action for loss of consortium is derived from Jennie Nordgren's
"medical malpractice action against a health care provider." (R. at 1-5). A "malpractice
action against a health care provider" is defined as:
any action against a health care provider whether in contract,
tort, breach of warranty, wrongful death, or otherwise, based
upon alleged personal injuries relating to or arising; out of
health care rendered or which should have been rendered by
the health care provider.
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-3-403(16) (emphasis added). Accordingly, Chad Nordgren's
claim for loss of consortium fits squarely within the definition of "malpractice action
against a health care provider"—a loss of consortium claim is a tort, based upon his
alleged personal injuries for loss of society, comfort and protection, which arose out of
health care rendered to Jennie Nordgren. See Utah Code Ann. § 78B-3-403(16).
Therefore, according to the plain language of the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act, the
trial court properly held that the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act applies to Chad
Nordgren's loss of consortium claim.
In fact, the Utah Supreme Court has already recognized that the Utah Health Care
Malpractice Act applies to loss of consortium claims derived from medical malpractice
injuries. See Brower v. Brown, 744 P.2d 1337, n. 1, 1338 (Utah 1987). In Brower,
13

plaintiff and her husband sued her doctor and the hospital for injuries related to a
puncture wound that she incurred during her hysterectomy. The Utah Supreme Court
acknowledged that the husband's loss of consortium claim "[arose] out of the same
negligent conduct" as plaintiffs claims and that the husband was required to file a notice
of intent pursuant to the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act. See id. (citing Utah Code
Ann. § 78-14-8 (1987) renumbered as Utah Code Ann. § 78B-3-412 (2008)).
Despite the clear language of the Loss of Consortium Act, the Utah Health Care
Malpractice Act, and case law, Chad Nordgren argues that the trial court erred in holding
that the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act applied to his loss of consortium claim. See
Appellant's Brief at 16-18. In the proceedings below, Mr. Nordgren argued that his loss
of consortium claim constituted a third-party action, which he argued was expressly
excluded from the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act. (R. at 44); see Utah Code Ann. §
78B-3-412(5).
Chad Nordgren's loss of consortium claim, however, is not a third-party action.
Utah case law defines a "third-party action" as an "action [that] is available only to assert
a claim against 'a person not a party to the action who is or may be liable to [a defendant]
for all or part of the plaintiffs claim against [that defendant].'" Arnica Mutual Ins. Co. v.
Schettler, 768 P.2d 950, n.8 (Utah App. 1989) (citing Utah Civ. P. 14(a)). Because Mr.
Nordgren is not a defendant seeking to recover from a non-party defendant, his claim for
loss of consortium is not a third-party action. Accordingly, the Utah Health Care
Malpractice Act applies to his loss of consortium claim against Defendants.
14

Mr. Nordgren also argues that the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act does not
apply to his loss of consortium claim because the health care in question was not
provided to him personally. (R. at 127:13-15); see also Appellant's Brief at 17-18.
Specifically, Mr. Nordgren argues that this Court should analyze his loss of consortium
claim under the Dowling v. Bullen holding. 2002 UT App. 372, 58 P.3d 877. See
Appellant's Brief at 18. Mr. Nordgren is mistaken. Dowling only analyzes a claim for
alienation of affections, a direct tort. 2002 UT App. at f 3. It does not address a claim for
loss of consortium, a derivative cause of action, that is statutorily defined by as a claim
that is "subject to the same defenses, limitations, immunities, and provisions applicable to
the claims of the injured person"' Utah Code Ann. § 30-2-1 l(4)(b) (emphasis added); see
also Hackford, 740 P.2d at 1290. Dowling, therefore, is not applicable to this matter and
should not govern this analysis.
Accordingly, pursuant to the plain language of the Utah Health Care Malpractice
Act and the Loss of Consortium Act, the trial court correctly held that the Utah Health
Care Malpractice Act applies to Chad Nordgren's loss of consortium claim. Defendant
Dr. Blomquist, therefore, respectfully requests that this Court affirm the decision of the
trial court on this basis.

3

Although Mr. Nordgren denied the applicability of the Utah Health Care Malpractice
Act to his loss of consortium claim in his Opposition Memorandum, this argument based
upon Dowling v. Bullen, 2002 UT App. 372, 58 P.3d 877, was not fully briefed because
Mr. Nordgren did not assert this argument until oral arguments on June 1, 2009. (R. at 44,
127:13). Defendant, however, will address this argument herein.
15

CONCLUSION
The trial court properly held that Plaintiff Chad Nordgren did not timely
commence his loss of consortium claim by serving his notice of claim fifteen (15) months
after his spouse, Jennie Nordgren, began pursuing her medical malpractice claim against
Defendants by serving a notice of intent to commence action. Chad Nordgren's failure to
timely commence his loss of consortium claim prejudiced Defendants, did not comply
with the parameters of the Loss of Consortium Act, and frustrated the purposes of the
Utah Health Care Malpractice Act. Accordingly, the trial court properly dismissed Chad
Nordgren's loss of consortium claim for his failure to abide by the Loss of Consortium
Act and Dr. Blomquist respectfully requests that this Court affirm the trial court's ruling.
DATED this ^

day of February, 2010.

RICHARDS BRANDT. MILLER NELSON

GEORGE T. NAEGLE
ANNE D. ARMSTRONG
CORTNEY KOCHEVAR
Attorneys for Defendant and
Appellee Roger D. Blomquist, M.D.
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ADDENDUM
A. Utah Code Ann. §30-2-11
B. Utah Code Ann. § 78B-2-401 et seq.
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Exhibit A

Page 2 ot 3

Westlaw
UCA 1953 §30-2-11

Page 1

c
West's Utah Code Annotated Cunentness
Title 30 Husband and Wife
^y Chaptei 2 Property Rights
-* § 30-2-11. Action for consortium due to personal injury
(1) For purposes of this section

(a) "injury" or "injured" means a significant permanent injury to a person that substantially changes that person's lifestyle and includes the following
(I) a partial or complete paralysis of one or more of the extremities,
(n) significant disfigurement, or
(in) incapability of the person of performing the types of jobs the person performed before the injury, and
(b) 'spouse" means the legal relationship
(l) established between a man and a woman as recognized by the laws of this state, and
(n) existing at the time of the person's injury
(2) The spouse of a person injured by a third party on or after May 4, 1997, may maintain an action against the
third party to recover for loss of consortium
(3) A claim for loss of consortium begins on the date of injury to the spouse The statute of limitations applicable to the injured person shall also apply to the spouse's claim of loss of consortium
(4) A claim for the spouse's loss of consortium shall be
(a) made at the time the claim of the injured person is made and joinder of actions shall be compulsory, and
(b) subject to the same defenses, limitations, immunities, and provisions applicable to the claims of the injured
person
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(5) The spouse's action for loss of consortium:
(a) shall be derivative from the cause of action existing in behalf of the injured person; and
(b) may not exisl in cases where the injured person would not have a cause of action.
(6) Fault of the spouse of the injured person, as well as fault of the injured person, shall be compared with the
fault of all other parties, pursuant to Sections 78B-5-817 through 78B-5-823, for purposes of reducing or barring
any recovery by the spouse for loss of consortium.
(7) Damages awarded for loss of consortium, when combined with any award to the injured person for general
damages, may not exceed any applicable statutory limit on noneconomic damages, including Section 78B-3-410.
(8) Damages awarded for loss of consortium which a governmental entity is required to pay, when combined
with any award to the injured person which a governmental entity is required to pay, may not exceed the liability
limit for one person in any one occurrence under Title 63G, Chapter 7, Governmental Immunity Act of Utah.

CREDIT(S)
Laws 1997, c. 163, § 1, eff. May 5, 1997; Laws 2005, c. 102, § 9, eff. May 2, 2005; Laws 2008, c. 3, § 43, eff.
Feb. 7,2008; Laws 2008. c. 382, § 331. eff. May 5, 2008.
Current through 2009 General Session and 2009 First Special Session
Copr (c) 2009 Thomson Reuters/West. No claim to orig. U.S. govt.
END OF DOCUMENT
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Westlaw
U.C.A. 1953 § 78B-3-401

Page 1

Formerly cited as UT ST § 78-14-1

c
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness
Title 78B. Judicial Code
^H Chapter 3. Actions and Venue
*M Part 4. Utah Health Care Malpractice Act (Refs & Annos)
-* § 78B-3-40L Title
This part shall be known and may be cited as the "Utah Health Care Malpractice Act."

CREDIT(S)
Current through 2009 General Session and 2009 First Special Session
Copr (c) 2009 Thomson Reuters/West. No claim to orig. U.S. govt.
END OF DOCUMENT
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Formerly cited as UT ST § 78-14-2

c
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness
Title 78B. Judicial Code
*H Chapter 3. Actions and Venue
*ii Part 4. Utah Health Care Malpractice Act (Refs & Annos)
-+ § 78B-3-402. Legislative findings and declarations—Purpose of act
(1) The Legislature finds and declares that the number of suits and claims for damages and the amount of judgments and settlements arising from health care has increased greatly in recent years. Because of these increases
the insurance industry has substantially increased the cost of medical malpractice insurance. The effect of increased insurance premiums and increased claims is increased health care cost, both through the health care providers passing the cost of premiums to the patient and through the provider's practicing defensive medicine because he views a patient as a potential adversary in a lawsuit. Further, certain health care providers are discouraged from continuing to provide services because of the high cost and possible unavailability of malpractice insurance.

(2) In view of these recent trends and with the intention of alleviating the adverse effects which these trends are
producing in the public's health care system, it is necessary to protect the public interest by enacting measures
designed to encourage private insurance companies to continue to provide health-related malpractice insurance
while at the same time establishing a mechanism to ensure the availability of insurance in the event that it becomes unavailable from private companies.
(3) In enacting this act, it is the purpose of the Legislature to provide a reasonable time in which actions may be
commenced against health care providers while limiting that time to a specific period for which professional liability insurance premiums can be reasonably and accurately calculated; and to provide other procedural
changes to expedite early evaluation and settlement of claims.

CREDIT(S)
Current through 2009 General Session and 2009 First Special Session
Copr (c) 2009 Thomson Reuters/West. No claim to orig. U.S. govt.
END OF DOCUMENT
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Formerly cited as UT ST § 78-14-3

c
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness
Title 78B. Judicial Code
"iii Chapter 3. Actions and Venue
*fi Part 4. Utah Health Care Malpractice Act (Refs & Annos)
*+ § 78B-3-403. Definitions
As used in this part:

(1) "Audiologist" means a person licensed to practice audiology under Title 58, Chapter 41, Speech-language
Pathology and Audiology Licensing Act.
(2) "Certified social worker" means a person licensed to practice as a certified social worker under Section
58-60-205.
(3) "Chiropractic physician" means a person licensed to practice chiropractic under Title 58, Chapter 73, Chiropractic Physician Practice Act.
(4) "Clinical social worker" means a person licensed to practice as a clinical social worker under Section 58-60-205.
(5) "Commissioner" means the commissioner of insurance as provided in Section 31A-2-102.
(6) "Dental hygienist" means a person licensed to engage in the practice of dental hygiene as defined in Section
58-69-102.
(7) "Dentist" means a person licensed to engage in the practice of dentistry as defined in Section 58-69-102.
(8) "Division" means the Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing created in Section 58-1-103.
(9) "Future damages" includes a judgment creditor's damages for future medical treatment, care or custody, loss
of future earnings, loss of bodily function, or future pain and suffering.
(10) "Health care" means any act or treatment performed or furnished, or which should have been performed or
furnished, by any health care provider for, to, or on behalf of a patient during the patient's medical care, treatment, or confinement.
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Formerly cited as UT ST § 78-14-3
(11) "Health care facility" means general acute hospitals, specialty hospitals, home health agencies, hospices,
nursing care facilities, assisted living facilities, birthing centers, ambulatory surgical facilities, small health care
facilities, health care facilities owned or operated by health maintenance organizations, and end stage renal disease facilities.
(12) "Health care provider" includes any person, partnership, association, corporation, or other facility or institution who causes to be rendered or who renders health care or professional services as a hospital, health care facility, physician, registered nurse, licensed practical nurse, nurse-midwife, licensed Direct-entry midwife, dentist, dental hygienist, optometrist, clinical laboratory technologist, pharmacist, physical therapist, physical therapist assistant, podiatric physician, psychologist, chiropractic physician, naturopathic physician, osteopathic physician, osteopathic physician and surgeon, audiologist, speech-language pathologist, clinical social worker, certified social worker, social service worker, marriage and family counselor, practitioner of obstetrics, or others rendering similar care and services relating to or arising out of the health needs of persons or groups of persons and
officers, employees., or agents of any of the above acting in the course and scope of their employment.
(13) "Hospital" means a public or private institution licensed under Title 26, Chapter 21, Health Care Facility
Licensing and Inspection Act.
(14) "Licensed Direct-entry midwife" means a person licensed under the Direct-entry Midwife Act to engage in
the practice of direct-entry midwifery as defined in Section 58-77-102.
(15) "Licensed practical nurse" means a person licensed to practice as a licensed practical nurse as provided in
Section 58-3 lb-301.
(16) "Malpractice action against a health care provider" means any action against a health care provider, whether in contract, tort, breach of warranty, wrongful death, or otherwise, based upon alleged personal injuries relating to or arising out of health care rendered or which should have been rendered by the health care provider.
(17) "Marriage and family therapist" means a person licensed to practice as a marriage therapist or family therapist under Sections 58-60-305 and 58-60-405.
(18) "Naturopathic physician" means a person licensed to engage in the practice of naturopathic medicine as
defined in Section 58-71-102.
(19) "Nurse-midwife" means a person licensed to engage in practice as a nurse midwife under Section 58-44a-301.
(20) "Optometrist" means a person licensed to practice optometry under Title 58, Chapter 16a, Utah Optometry
Practice Act.
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(21) "Osteopathic physician" means a person licensed to practice osteopathy under Title 58, Chapter 68, Utah
Osteopathic Medical Practice Act.
(22) "Patient" means a person who is under the care of a health care provider, under a contract, express or im- plied.
(23) "Periodic payments" means the payment of money or delivery of other property to a judgment creditor at
intervals ordered by the court.
(24) "Pharmacist" means a person licensed to practice pharmacy as provided in Section 58-17b-301.
(25) "Physical therapist" means a person licensed to practice physical therapy under Title 58, Chapter 24b,
Physical Therapy Practice Act.
(26) "Physical therapist assistant" means a person licensed to practice physical therapy, within the scope of a
physical therapist assistant license, under Title 58, Chapter 24b, Physical Therapy Practice Act.
(27) "Physician" means a person licensed to practice medicine and surgery under Title 58, Chapter 67, Utah
Medical Practice Act.
(28) "Podiatric physician" means a person licensed to practice podiatry under Title 58, Chapter 5a, Podiatric
Physician Licensing Act.
(29) "Practitioner of obstetrics" means a person licensed to practice as a physician in this state under Title 58,
Chapter 67, Utah Medical Practice Act, or under Title 58, Chapter 68, Utah Osteopathic Medical Practice Act.
(30) "Psychologist" means a person licensed under Title 58, Chapter 61, Psychologist Licensing Act, to engage
in the practice of psychology as defined in Section 58-61-102.
(31) "Registered nurse" means a person licensed to practice professional nursing as provided in Section 58-3 ib-301.
(32) "Relative" means a patient's spouse, parent, grandparent, stepfather, stepmother, child, grandchild, brother,
sister, half brother, half sister, or spouse's parents. The term includes relationships that are created as a result of
adoption.
(33) "Representative" means the spouse, parent, guardian, trustee, attorney-in-fact, person designated to make
decisions on behalf of a patient under a medical power of attorney, or other legal agent of the patient.
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(34) "Social sei vice worker" means a person licensed to practice as a social service vvoiker under Section
58-60-205.
(35) "Speech-language pathologist" means a person licensed to practice speech-language pathology under Title
58, Chapter 41, Speech-language Pathology and Audiology Licensing Act.
(36) "Tort" means any legal wrong, breach of duty, or negligent or unlawful act or omission proximately causing injury or damage to another.
(37) "Unanticipated outcome" means the outcome of a medical treatment or procedure that differs from an expected result.

CREDIT(S)
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c
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness
Title 78B. Judicial Code
K
M Chapter 3. Actions and Venue
*ii Part 4. Utah Health Care Malpractice Act (Refs & Annos)
-f § 78B-3-404. Statute of limitations—Exceptions—Application
(1) A malpractice action against a health care provider shall be commenced within two years after the plaintiff
or patient discovers, or through the use of reasonable diligence should have discovered the injury, whichever
first occurs, but not to exceed four years after the date of the alleged act, omission, neglect, or occurrence.

(2) Notwithstanding Subsection (1):
(a) in an action where the allegation against the health care provider is that a foreign object has been wrongfully left within a patient's body, the claim shall be barred unless commenced within one year after the
plaintiff or patient discovers, or through the use of reasonable diligence should have discovered, the existence
of the foreign object wrongfully left in the patient's body, whichever first occurs; or
(b) in an action where it is alleged that a patient has been prevented from discovering misconduct on the part
of a health care provider because that health care provider has affirmatively acted to fraudulently conceal the
alleged misconduct, the claim shall be barred unless commenced within one year after the plaintiff or patient
discovers, or through the use of reasonable diligence, should have discovered the fraudulent concealment,
whichever first occurs.
(3) The limitations in this section shall apply to all persons, regardless of minority or other legal disability under
Section 78B-2-108 or any other provision of the law.
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c
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness
Title 78B. Judicial Code
K
M Chapter 3. Actions and Venue
*S Part 4. Utah Health Care Malpractice Act (Rets & Annos)
-t § 78B-3-405. Amount of award reduced by amounts of collateral sources available to plaintiff-No reduction where subrogation right exists—Collateral sources defined—Procedure to preserve
subrogation rights—Evidence admissible—Exceptions
(1) In all malpractice actions against health care providers as defined in Section 78B-3-403 in which damages
are awarded to compensate the plaintiff for losses sustained, the court shall reduce the amount of the award by
the total of all amounts paid to the plaintiff from all collateral sources which are available to him. No reduction
may be made for collateral sources for which a subrogation right exists as provided in this section nor shall there
be a reduction for any collateral payment not included in the award of damages.

(2) Upon a finding of liability and an awarding of damages by the trier of fact, the court shall receive evidence
concerning the total amounts of collateral sources which have been paid to or for the benefit of the plaintiff or
are otherwise available to him. The court shall also take testimony of any amount which has been paid, contributed, or forfeited by. or on behalf of the plaintiff or members of his immediate family to secure his right to any
collateral source benefit which he is receiving as a result of his injury, and shall offset any reduction in the
award by those amounts. Evidence may not be received and a reduction may not be made with respect to future
collateral source benefits except as specified in Subsection (5).
(3) For purposes of this section "collateral source" means payments made to or for the benefit of the plaintiff for:
(a) medical expenses and disability payments payable under the United States Social Security Act, any federal, state, or local income disability act, or any other public program, except the federal programs which are required by law to seek subrogation;
(b) any health, sickness, or income replacement insurance, automobile accident insurance that provides health
benefits or income replacement coverage, and any other similar insurance benefits, except life insurance benefits available to the plaintiff, whether purchased by the plaintiff or provided by others;
(c) any contract or agreement of any person, group, organization, partnership, or corporation to provide, pay
for, or reimburse the costs of hospital, medical, dental, or other health care services, except benefits received
as gifts, contributions, or assistance made gratuitously; and
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(d) any contractual or voluntary wage continuation plan provided by employers or any other system intended
to provide wages during a period of disability.
(4) To preserve subrogation rights for amounts paid or received prior to settlement or judgment, a provider of
collateral sources shall, at least 30 days before settlement or trial of the action, serve a written notice upon each
health care provider against whom the malpractice action has been asserted. The written notice shall state:
(a) the name and address of the provider of collateral sources;
(b) the amount of collateral sources paid;
(c) the names and addresses of all persons who received payment; and
(d) the items and purposes for which payment has been made.
(5) Evidence is admissible of government programs that provide payments or benefits available in the future to
or for the benefit of the plaintiff to the extent available irrespective of the recipient's ability to pay. Evidence of
the likelihood or unlikelihood that the programs, payments, or benefits will be available in the future is also admissible. The trier of fact may consider the evidence in determining the amount of damages awarded to a
plaintiff for future expenses.
(6) A provider of collateral sources is not entitled to recover any amount of benefits from a health care provider,
the plaintiff, or any other person or entity as reimbursement for collateral source payments made prior to settlement or judgment, including any payments made under Title 26, Chapter 19, Medical Benefits Recovery Act,
except to the extent that subrogation rights to amounts paid prior to settlement or judgment are preserved as
provided in this section.
(7) All policies of insurance providing benefits affected by this section are construed in accordance with this section.
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c
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness
Title 78B. Judicial Code
*M Chapter 3. Actions and Venue
*y Part 4. Utah Health Care Malpractice Act (Refs & Annos)
-• § 78B-3-406. Failure to obtain informed consent—Proof required of patient—Defenses—Consent
to health care
(1) When a person submits to health care rendered by a health care provider, it is presumed that actions taken by
the health care provider are either expressly or impliedly authorized to be done. For a patient to recover damages
from a health care provider in an action based upon the provider's failure to obtain informed consent, the patient
must prove the following:

(a) that a provider-patient relationship existed between the patient and health care provider;
(b) the health care provider rendered health care to the patient;
(c) the patient suffered personal injuries arising out of the health care rendered;
(d) the health care rendered carried with it a substantial and significant risk of causing the patient serious harm;
(e) the patient was not informed of the substantial and significant risk;
(f) a reasonable, prudent person in the patient's position would not have consented to the health care rendered
after having been fully informed as to all facts relevant to the decision to give consent; and
(g) the unauthorized part of the health care rendered was the proximate cause of personal injuries suffered by
the patient.
(2) In determining what a reasonable, prudent person in the patient's position would do under the circumstances,
the finder of fact shall use the viewpoint of the patient before health care was provided and before the occurrence of any personal injuries alleged to have arisen from said health care.
(3) It shall be a defense to any malpractice action against a health care provider based upon alleged failure to obtain informed consent if:
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(a) the risk of the serious harm which the patient actually suffered was relatively minor;
(b) the risk of serious harm to the patient from the health care provider was commonly known to the public;

(c) the patient stated, prior to receiving the health care complained of, that he would accept the health care involved regardless of the risk; or that he did not want to be informed of the matters to which he would be entitled to be informed;
(d) the health care provider, after considering all of the attendant facts and circumstances, used reasonable discretion as to the manner and extent to which risks were disclosed, if the health care provider reasonably believed that additional disclosures could be expected to have a substantial and adverse effect on the patient's
condition; or
(e) the patient or his representative executed a written consent which sets forth the nature and purpose of the
intended health care and which contains a declaration that the patient accepts the risk of substantial and serious harm, if any, in hopes of obtaining desired beneficial results of health care and which acknowledges that
health care providers involved have explained his condition and the proposed health care in a satisfactory
manner and that all questions asked about the health care and its attendant risks have been answered in a manner satisfactory to the patient or his representative.
(4) The written consent shall be a defense to an action against a health care provider based upon failure to obtain
informed consent unless the patient proves that the person giving the consent lacked capacity to consent or
shows by clear and convincing evidence that the execution of the written consent was induced by the defendant's
affirmative acts of fraudulent misrepresentation or fraudulent omission to state material facts.
(5) This act may not be construed to prevent any person 18 years of age or over from refusing to consent to
health care for his own person upon personal or religious grounds.
(6) Except as provided in Section 76-7-304.5, the following persons are authorized and empowered to consent to
any health care not prohibited by law:
(a) any parent, whether an adult or a minor, for the parent's minor child;
(b) any married person, for a spouse;
(c) any person temporarily standing in loco parentis, whether formally serving or not, for the minor under that
person's care and any guardian for the guardian's ward;
(d) any person 18 years of age or over for that person's parent who is unable by reason of age, physical or
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mental condition, to provide such consent;
(e) any patient 18 years of age or over;
(f) any female regardless of age or marital status, when given in connection with her pregnancy or childbirth;
(g) in the absence of a parent, any adult for the adult's minor brother or sister; and
(h) in the absence of a parent, any grandparent for the grandparent's minor grandchild.
(7) A person who in good faith consents or authorizes health care treatment or procedures for another as
provided by this act may not be subject to civil liability.
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c
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness
Title 78B. Judicial Code
*y Chapter 3. Actions and Venue
*il Part 4. Utah Health Care Malpractice Act (Refs & Annos)
•sf § 78B-3-407. Limitation on actions against health care providers when parent or guardian refuses to consent to health care of child
(1) A malpractice action against a health care provider may not be brought on the basis of the consequences resulting from the refusal of a child's parent or guardian to consent to the child's health care, if:

(a) the health care is recommended by the health care provider;
(b) the parent or guardian is provided with sufficient information to make an informed decision regarding the
lecQminejydation ofthehzatih care proy'idtr; and
(c) the consent of the parent or guardian is required by law before the health care may be administered.
(2) The sole purpose of this section is to prohibit a malpractice action against a health care provider under the
circumstances set forth by this section. This section may not be construed to:
(a) create a new cause of action;
(b) expand an existing cause of action;
(c) impose a new duty on a health care provider; or
(d) expand an existing duty of a health care provider.
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c
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness
Title 78B. Judicial Code
*(i Chapter 3. Actions and Venue
*g Part 4. Utah Health Care Malpractice Act (Refs & Annos)
*> § 78B-3-408. Writing required as basis for liability for breach of guarantee, warranty, contract, or assurance of result
Liability may not be imposed upon any health care provider on the basis of an alleged breach of guarantee, warranty, contract, or assurance of result to be obtained from any health c#re rendered unless the guarantee, warranty, contract, or assurance is set forth in writing and signed by the health care provider or an authorized agent
of the provider.
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c
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness
Title 78B. Judicial Code
K
M Chapter 3. Actions and Venue
*M Part 4. Utah Health Care Malpractice Act (Refs & Annos)
.+ § 78B-3-409. Ad damnum clause prohibited in complaint
A dollar amount may not be specified in the prayer of a complaint filed in a malpractice action against a health
care provider. The complaint shall merely pray for such damages as are reasonable in the circumstances.
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c
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness
Title 78B. Judicial Code
*y Chapter 3. Actions and Venue
*li Part 4. Utah Health Care Malpractice Act (Refs & Armos)
-f § 78B-3-410. Limitation of award of noneconomic damages in malpractice actions
(1) In a malpractice action_against a health care provider, an injured plaintiff may recover noneconomic losses to
compensate for pain, suffering, and inconvenience. The amount of damages awarded for noneconomic loss may
not exceed:

(a) for a cause of action arising before July 1, 2001, $250,000;
(b) for a cause of action arising on or after July 1, 2001 and before July 1, 2002, the limitation is adjusted for
inflation to $400,000; and
(c) for a cause of action arising on or after July 1, 2002, the $400,000 limitation described in Subsection (l)(b)
shall be adjusted for inflation as provided in Subsection (2).
(2)(a) Beginning July 1, 2002 and each July 1 thereafter, the limit for damages under Subsection (l)(c) shall be
adjusted for inflation by the state treasurer.'
(b) By July 15 of each year, the state treasurer shall:
(i) certify the inflation-adjusted limit calculated under this Subsection (2); and
(ii) inform the Administrative Office of the Courts of the certified limit.
(c) The amount resulting from Subsection (2)(a) shall:
(i) be rounded to the nearest $10,000; and
(ii) apply to a cause of action arising on or after the date the annual adjustment is made.
(3) As used in this section, "inflation" means the seasonally adjusted consumer price index for all urban con-
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sumers as published by the Bureau of Labor Statistics of the United States Depaitment of Labor.
(4) The limit under Subsection (1) does not apply to awards of punitive damages.
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West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness
Title 78B. Judicial Code
K
M Chapter 3. Actions and Venue
K
M Part 4. Utah Health Care Malpractice Act (Refs & Annos)
-f § 78B-3-411. Limitation on attorney's contingency fee in malpractice action
(1) In any malpractice action against a health care provider as defined in Section 78B-3-403, an attorney may
not collect a contingent fee for representing a client seeking damages in connection with or arising out of personal injury or wrongful death caused by the negligence of another which exceeds 33-1/3% of the amount recovered.

(2) This limitation applies regardless of whether the recovery is by settlement, arbitration, judgment, or whether
appeal is involved.
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c
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness
Title 78B. Judicial Code
K
\g Chapter 3. Actions and Venue
*li Part 4. Utah Health Care Malpractice Act (Refs & Amios)
-• § 78B-3-412. Notice of intent to commence action
(1) A malpractice action against a health care provider may not be initiated unless and until the plaintiff gives
the prospective defendant or his executor or successor, at least 90 days' prior notice of intent to commence an action.

(2) The notice shall include:
(a) a general statement of the nature of the claim;
(b) the persons involved;
(c) the date, time, and place of the occurrence;
(d) the circumstances surrounding the claim;
(e) specific allegations of misconduct on the part of the prospective defendant; and
(f) the nature of the alleged injuries and other damages sustained.
(3) Notice may be in letter or affidavit form executed by the plaintiff or his attorney. Service shall be accomplished by persons authorized and in the manner prescribed by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure for the service
of the summons and complaint in a civil action or by certified mail, return receipt requested, in which case notice shall be considered served on the date of mailing.
(4) Notice shall be served within the time allowed for commencing a malpractice action against a health care
provider. If the notice is served less than ninety days prior to the expiration of the applicable time period, the
time for commencing the malpractice action against the health care provider shall be extended to 120 days from
the date of service of notice.
(5) This section shall, for purposes of determining its retroactivity, not be construed as relating to the limitation
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on the time for commencing any action, and shall apply only to causes of action aiising on or after April 1,
1976. This section shall not apply to third party actions, counterclaims or crossclaims against a health care provider.
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West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness
Title 78B. Judicial Code
K
\g Chapter 3. Actions and Venue
K
\g Part 4. Utah Health Care Malpractice Act (Rets & Annos)
-4- § 78B-3-413. Professional liability insurance coverage for providers-Insurance commissioner
may require joint underwriting authority
(1) The commissioner may, after a public hearing, find that professional liability insurance coverage for health
care providers is not readily available in the voluntary market in a specific part of this state, and that the public
interest requires that action be taken.

(2) The commissioner may promulgate rules and implement plans to provide insurance coverage through all insurers issuing professional liability policies and individual and group accident and sickness policies providing
medical, surgical or hospital expense coverage on either a prepaid or an expense incurred basis, including personal injury protection and medical expense coverage issued incidental to liability insurance policies.
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c
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness
Title 78B. Judicial Code
K
\g Chapter 3. Actions and Venue
*i§| Part 4. Utah Health Care Malpractice Act (Refs & Annos)
-* § 78B-3-414. Periodic payment of future damages in malpractice actions
(1) In any malpractice action against a health care provider, as defined in Section 78B-3-403, the court shall, at
the request of any party, order that future damages which equal or exceed $100,000, less amounts payable for attorney fees and other costs which are due at the time of judgment, shall be paid by periodic payments rather than
by a lump sum payment.

(2) In rendering a judgment which orders the payment of future damages by periodic payments, the court shall
order periodic payments to provide a fair correlation between the sustaining of losses and the payment of dam- ages.
(a) Lost future earnings shall be paid over the judgment creditor's work life expectancy.
(b) The court shall also order, when appropriate, that periodic payments increase at a fixed rate, equal to the
rate of inflation v/hich the finder of fact used to determine the amount of future damages, or as measured by
the most recent Consumer Price Index applicable to Utah for all goods and services.
(c) The present cash value of all periodic payments shall equal the fact finder's award of future damages, less
any amount paid for attorney fees and costs.
(d) The present cash value of periodic payments shall be determined by discounting the total amount of periodic payments projected over the judgment creditor's life expectancy, by the rate of interest which the finder
of fact used to reduce the amount of future damages to present value, or the rate of interest available at the
time of trial on one year U.S. Government Treasury Bills.
(3) Before periodic payments of future damages may be ordered, the court shall require a judgment debtor to
post security which assures full payment of those damages. Security for payment of a judgment of periodic payments may be in one or more of the following forms:
(a) a bond executed by a qualified insurer;
(b) an annuity contract executed by a qualified insurer;
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(c) evidence of applicable and collectable liability insurance with one or more qualified insurers;
(d) an agreement by one or more qualified insurers to guarantee payment of the judgment; or
(e) any other form of security approved by the court.
(4) Security which complies with this section may also serve as a supersedeas bond, where one is required.
(5) A judgment which orders payment of future damages by periodic payments shall specify the recipient or recipients of the payments, the dollar amount of the payments, the interval between payments, and the number of
payments or the period of time over which payments shall be made. Those payments may only be modified in
the event of the death of the judgment creditor.
(6) If the court finds that the judgment debtor, or the assignee of his obligation to make periodic payments, has
failed to make periodic payments as ordered by the court, it shall, in addition to the required periodic payments,
order the judgment debtor or his assignee to pay the judgment creditor all damages caused by the failure to make
payments, including court costs and attorney fees.
(7) The obligation to make periodic payments for all future damages, other than damages for loss of future earnings, shall cease upon the death of the judgment creditor. Damages awarded for loss of future earnings may not
be reduced or payments terminated by reason of the death of the judgment creditor, but shall be paid to persons
to whom the judgment creditor owed a duty of support, as provided by law, immediately prior to his death. In
that case the court which rendered the original judgment may, upon petition of any party in interest, modify the
judgment to award and apportion the unpaid future damages in accordance with this section.'
(8) If security is posted in accordance with Subsection (3), and approved by a final judgment entered under this
section, the judgment is considered to be satisfied, and the judgment debtor on whose behalf the security is posted shall be discharged.
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West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness
Title 78B. Judicial Code
K
M Chapter 3. Actions and Venue
*® Part 4. Utah Health Care Malpractice Act (Refs & Annos)
-* § 78B-3-415. Actions under Utah Governmental Immunity Act
The provisions of this part shall apply to malpractice actions against health care providers which are brought under the Utah Governmental Immunity Act if applicable. This part may not affect the requirements for filing notices of claims, times for commencing actions and limitations on amounts recoverable under the Utah Governmental Immunity Act.
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West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness
Title 78B. Judicial Code
*M Chapter 3. Actions and Venue
K
® Part 4. Utah Health Care Malpractice Act (Refs & Annos)
-f § 78B-3-416. Division to provide panel—Exemption—Procedures—Statute of limitations tolled-Composition of panel—Expenses—Division authorized to set license fees
(l)(a) The division shall provide a hearing panel in alleged medical liability cases against health care providers
as defined in Section 78B-3-403, except dentists.

(b)(i) The division shall establish procedures for prelitigation consideration of medical liability claims for
damages arising out of the provision of or alleged failure to provide health care.
(ii) The division may establish rules necessary to administer the process and procedures related to prelitigation hearings and the conduct of prelitigation hearings in accordance with Sections 78B-3-416 through
78B-3-420.
(c) The proceedings are informal, nonbinding, and are not subject to Title 63G, Chapter 4, Administrative Procedures Act, but are compulsory as a condition precedent to commencing litigation.
(d) Proceedings conducted under authority of this section are confidential, privileged, and immune from civil
process.
(2)(a) The party initiating a medical liability action shall file a request for prelitigation panel review with the division within 60 days after the service of a statutory notice of intent to commence action under Section 78B-3-412.
(b) The request shall include a copy of the notice of intent to commence action. The request shall be mailed to
all health care providers named in the notice and request.
(3)(a) The filing of a request for prelitigation panel review under this section tolls the applicable statute of limitations until the earlier of 60 days following the division's issuance of an opinion by the prelitigation panel, or 60
days following the termination of jurisdiction by the division as provided in this subsection. The division shall
send any opinion issued by the panel to all parties by regular mail.
(b)(i) The division shall complete a prelitigation hearing under this section within 180 days after the filing of
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the request for prelitigation panel review, or within any longer period as agreed upon in writing by all parties
to the review.

(ii) If the prelitigation hearing has not been completed within the time limits established in Subsection
(3)(b)(i), the division has no further jurisdiction over the matter subject to review and the claimant is considered to have complied with all conditions precedent required under this section prior to the commencement of litigation.

(c)(i) The claimant and any respondent may agree by written stipulation that no useful purpose would be
served by convening a prelitigation panel under this section.

(ii) When the stipulation is filed with the division, the division shall within ten days after receipt enter an
order divesting itself of jurisdiction over the claim, as it concerns the stipulating respondent, and stating that
the claimant has complied with all conditions precedent to the commencement of litigation regarding the claim.

(4) The division shall provide for and appoint an appropriate panel or panels to hear complaints of medical liability and damages, made by or on behalf of any patient who is an alleged victim of medical liability. The panels
are composed of:

(a) one member who is a resident lawyer currently licensed and in good standing to practice law in this state
and who shall serve as chairman of the panel, who is appointed by the division from among qualified individuals who have registered with the division indicating a willingness to serve as panel members, and a willingness to comply with the rules of professional conduct governing lawyers in the state of Utah, and who has
completed division training regarding conduct of panel hearings;

(b)(i) one member who is a licensed health care provider listed under Section 78B-3-403, who is practicing
and knowledgeable in the same specialty as the proposed defendant, and who is appointed by the division in
accordance with Subsection (5); or

(ii) in claims against only hospitals or their employees, one member who is an individual currently serving
in a hospital administration position directly related to hospital operations or conduct that includes responsibility for the area of practice that is the subject of the liability claim, and who is appointed by the division; and

(c) a lay panelist who is not a lawyer, doctor, hospital employee, or other health care provider, and who is a
responsible citizen of the state, selected and appointed by the division from among individuals who have completed division training with respect to panel hearings.

(5)(a) Each person listed as a health care provider in Section 78B-3-403 and practicing under a license issued by
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the state, is obligated as a condition of holding that license to participate as a member of a medical liability prelitigation panel at reasonable times, places, and intervals, upon issuance, with advance notice given in a reasonable time frame, by the division of an Order to Participate as a Medical Liability Prelitigation Panel Member.
(b) A licensee may be excused from appearance and participation as a panel member upon the division finding
participation by the licensee will create an unreasonable burden or hardship upon the licensee.
(c) A licensee whom the division finds failed to appear and participate as a panel member when so ordered,
without adequate explanation or justification and without being excused for cause by the division, may be assessed an administrative fine not to exceed $5,000.
(d) A licensee whom the division finds intentionally or repeatedly failed to appear and participate as a panel
member when so ordered, without adequate explanation or justification and without being excused for cause
by the division, may be assessed an administrative fine not to exceed $5,000, and is guilty of unprofessional
conduct.
(e) All fines collected under Subsections (5)(c) and (d) shall be deposited in the Physicians Education Fund
created in Section 58-67a-l.
(6) Each person selected as a panel member shall certify, under oath, that he has no bias or conflict of interest
with respect to any matter under consideration.
(7) Members of the prelitigation hearing panels shall receive per diem compensation and travel expenses for attending panel hearings as established by rules of the division.
(8)(a) In addition to the actual cost of administering the licensure of health care providers, the division may set
license fees of health care providers within the limits established by law equal to their proportionate costs of administering prelitigation panels.
(b) The claimant bears none of the costs of administering the prelitigation panel except under Section 78B-3-420.
CREDIT(S)
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c
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness
Title 78B. Judicial Code
*ii Chapter 3. Actions and Venue
*di Part 4. Utah Health Care Malpractice Act (Refs & Annos)
-+ § 78B-3-417. Proceedings—Authority of panel—Rights of parties to proceedings
(1) No record of the proceedings is required and all evidence, documents, and exhibits are returned to the parties
or witnesses who provided the evidence, documents, and exhibits at the end of the proceedings upon the request
of the parties or witnesses who provided the evidence.

(2) The division may issue subpoenas for medical records directly related to the claim of medical liability in accordance with division rule and in compliance with the following:
(a) the subpoena shall be prepared by the requesting party in proper form for issuance by the division; and
(b) the subpoena shall be accompanied by:
(i) an affidavit prepared by the person requesting the subpoena attesting to the fact the medical record subject to subpoena is believed to be directly related to the medical liability claim to which the subpoena is related; or
(ii) by a written release for the medical records to be provided to the person requesting the subpoena, signed
by the individual who is the subject of the medical record or by that individual's guardian or conservator.
(3) Per diem reimbursement to panel members and expenses incurred by the panel in the conduct of prelitigation
panel hearings shall be paid by the division. Expenses related to subpoenas are paid by the requesting party, including witness fees and mileage.
(4) The proceedings are informal and formal rules of evidence are not applicable. There is no discovery or perpetuation of testimony in the proceedings, except upon special order of the panel, and for good cause shown
demonstrating extraordinary circumstances.
(5)(a) A party is entitled to attend, personally or with counsel, and participate in the proceedings, except upon
special order of the panel and unanimous agreement of the parties. The proceedings are confidential and closed
to the public.
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(b)No party has the right to cross-examine, rebut, or demand that customary formalities of civil trials and
court proceedings be followed. The panel may, however, request special or supplemental participation of some
or all parties in particular respects.
(c) Communications between the panel and the parties, except the testimony of the parties on the merits of the
dispute, are disclosed to all other parties.
(6) The division shall appoint a panel to consider the claim and set the matter for panel review as soon as practicable after receipt of a request.
(7) Parties may be represented by counsel in proceedings before a panel.
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Copr (c) 2009 Thomson Reuters/West. No claim to orig. U.S. govt.
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West's Utah Code Annotated Curre-ntness
Title 78B. Judicial Code
*H Chapter 3. Actions and Venue
*j§ Part 4. Utah Health Care Malpractice Act (Refs & Annos)
-f § 78B-3-418. Decision and recommendations of panel—No judicial or other review
The panel shall render its opinion in writing not later than 30 days after the end of the proceedings. The panel
shall determine on the basis of the evidence whether each claim against each health care provider has merit or
has no merit and, if meritorious, whether the conduct complained of resulted in harm to the claimant.

There is no judicial or other review or appeal of the panel's decision or recommendations.
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West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness
Title 78B. Judicial Code
K
M Chapter 3. Actions and Venue
K
m Part 4. Utah Health Care Malpractice Act (Refs &, Annos)
-* § 78B-3-419. Evidence of proceedings not admissible in subsequent action—Panelist may not be
compelled to testify—Immunity of panelist from civil liability—Information regarding professional
conduct
(1) Evidence of the proceedings conducted by the medical review panel and its results, opinions, findings, and
determinations are not admissible as evidence in an action subsequently brought by the claimant in a court of
competent jurisdiction.

(2) No panelist may be compelled to testify in a civil action subsequently filed with regard to the subject matter
of the panel's review. A panelist has immunity from civil liability arising from participation as a panelist and for
all communications, findings, opinions, and conclusions made in the course and scope of duties prescribed by
this section.
(3) Nothing in this chapter may be interpreted to prohibit the division from considering any information contained in a statutory notice of intent to commence action, request for prelitigation panel review, or written findings of a panel with respect to the division's determining whether a licensee engaged in unprofessional or unlawful conduct.

CREDIT(S)
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West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness
Title 78B. Judicial Code
*H Chapter 3. Actions and Venue
K
m Part 4. Utah Health Care Malpractice Act (Refs &. Annos)
-* § 78B-3-420. Proceedings considered a binding arbitration hearing upon written agreement of
parties—Compensation to members of panel
Upon written agreement by all parties, the proceeding may be considered a binding arbitration hearing and proceed under Title 78B, Chapter 11, Utah Uniform Arbitration Act, except for the selection of the panel, which is
done as set forth in Subsection 78B-3-416(4). If the proceeding is considered an arbitration proceeding, the
parties are equally responsible for compensation to the members of the panel for services rendered.
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c
West's Utah Code Annotated Cuirentness
Title 78B Judicial Code
K
B Chaptei 3 Actions and Venue
K
Q Part 4 Utah Health Care Malpractice Act (Rets & Annos)
-+ § 78B-3-421. Arbitration agreements
(1) After May 2, 1999, for a binding arbitration agreement between a patient and a health care provider to be
validly executed oi, if the requirements of this Subsection (1) have not been previously met on at least one occasion, renewed

(a) the patient shall be given, in writing, the following information on
(i) the requirement that the patient must arbitrate a claim instead of having the claim heard by a judge or jury,
(n) the role of an arbitrator and the manner in which arbitrators are selected under the agreement,
(in) the patient's responsibility, if any, for arbitration-related costs under the agreement,
(IV) the right of the patient to decline to enter into the agreement and still receive health caie if Subsection
(3) applies,
(v) the automatic renewal of the agreement each year unless the agreement is canceled in writing before the
renewal date,
(vi) the right of the patient to have questions about the arbitration agreement answered,
(vn) the right of the patient to rescind the agreement within ten days of signing the agreement, and
(vm) the right of the patient to require mediation of the dispute prior to the arbitration of the dispute,
(b) the agreement shall require that
(l) except as provided in Subsection (l)(b)(n), a panel of three arbitrators shall be selected as follows
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(A) one arbitrator collectively selected by all persons claiming damages;
(B) one arbitrator selected by the health care provider; and
(C) a third arbitrator:
(I) jointly selected by all persons claiming damages and the health care provider; or
(II) if both parties cannot agree on the selection of the third arbitrator, the other two arbitrators shall appoint the third arbitrator from a list of individuals approved as arbitrators by the state or federal courts
of Utah; or
(ii) if both parties agree, a single arbitrator may be selected;
(iii) all parties waive the requirement of Section 78B-3-416 to appear before a hearing panel in a malpractice action against a health care provider;
(iv) the patient be given the right to rescind the agreement within ten days of signing the agreement;
(v) the term of the agreement be for one year and that the agreement be automatically renewed each year unless the agreement is canceled in writing by the patient or_health care provider before the renewal date;
(vi) the patient has the right to retain legal counsel;
(vii) the agreement only apply to:
(A) an error or omission that occurred after the agreement was signed, provided that the agreement may
allow a person who would be a proper party in court to participate in an arbitration proceeding;
(B) the claim of:
(I) a person who signed the agreement;
(II) a person on whose behalf the agreement was signed under Subsection (6); and
(III) the unborn child of the person described in this Subsection (l)(b)(vii)(B), for 12 months from the
date the agreement is signed; and
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(C) the claim of a person who is not a party to the contract if the sole basis for the claim is an injury sustained by a person described in Subsection (l)(b)(vii)(B); and
(c) the patient shall be verbally encouraged to:
(i) read the written information required by Subsection (l)(a) and the arbitration agreement; and
(ii) ask any questions.
(2) When a medical malpractice action is arbitrated, the action shall:
(a) be subject to Chapter 31 a, Utah Uniform Arbitration Act; and
(b) include any one or more of the following when requested by the patient before an arbitration hearing is
commenced:
(i) mandatory mediation;
(ii) retention of the jointly selected arbitrator for both the liability and damages stages of an arbitration proceeding if the arbitration is bifurcated; and
(iii) the filing of the panel's award of damages as a judgement against the provider in the appropriate district
court.
(3) Notwithstanding Subsection (1), a patient may not be denied health care on the sole basis that the patient or a
person described in Subsection (6) refused to enter into a binding arbitration agreement with a health care pro- vider.
(4) A written acknowledgment of having received a written explanation of a binding arbitration agreement
signed by or on behalf of the patient shall be a defense to a claim that the patient did not receive a written explanation of the agreement as required by Subsection (1) unless the patient:
(a) proves that the person who signed the agreement lacked the capacity to do so; or
(b) shows by clear and convincing evidence that the execution of the agreement was induced by the health
care provider's affirmative acts of fraudulent misrepresentation or fraudulent omission to state material facts.
(5) The requirements of Subsection (1) do not apply to a claim governed by a binding arbitration agreement that
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was executed or renewed before May 3, 1999.
(6) A legal guardian or a person described in Subsection 78B-3-406(6), except a person temporarily standing in
loco parentis, may execute or rescind a binding arbitration agreement on behalf of a patient.
(7) This section does not apply to any arbitration agreement that is subject to the Federal Arbitration Act, 9
U.S.C. Sec. 1 et seq.
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c
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness
Title 78B. Judicial Code
^ii Chapter 3. Actions and Venue
*g Part 4. Utah Health Care Malpractice Act (Refs & Annos)
-f § 78B-3-422. Evidence of disclosures-Civil proceedings-Unanticipated outcomes—Medical care
(1) As used in this section:

(a) "Defendant" means the defendant in a malpractice action against a health care provider.
(b) "Health care provider" includes an agent of a health care provider.
(c) "Patient" includes any person associated with the patient.
(2) In any civil action or arbitration proceeding relating to an unanticipated outcome of medical care, any unsworn statement, affirmation, gesture, or conduct made to the patient by the defendant shall be inadmissible as
evidence of an admission against interest or of liability if it:
(a) expresses:
(i) apology, sympathy, commiseration, condolence, or compassion; or
(ii) a general sense of benevolence; or
(b) describes:
(i) the sequence of events relating to the unanticipated outcome of medical care;
(ii) the significance of events; or
(iii) both.
(3) Except as provided in Subsection (2), this section does not alter any other law or rule that applies to the ad-
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missibility of evidence in a medical malpractice action.
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